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In this chapter I survey the ways in which anarchists have understood the concept of freedom. I 
argue that anarchists have understood freedom in three ways, which often overlap and combine. 
Anarchists understand freedom negatively, as freedom from domination, positively, in terms of 
the enabling conditions of freedom, and freedom with or freedom in, or the necessary institutional 
parameters for freedom. This latter conception of freedom is arguably more central to the lived 
anarchist movement than many have recognized, pervading the major anarcho-syndicalist unions 
and most anarchist groups. I link it to negative and positive accounts of freedom in order to defend 
a wide and plural account of anarchist accounts of freedom. The institutional focus of the paper 
also enables an approach to freedom that takes inter-group freedoms seriously, and allows us to 
link anarchism more coherently to the dynamics of international relations. Each of these aspects 
of the problem of freedom in anarchist politics demands a reappraisal of the constitutionalizing 
practices of anarchist groups, and I conclude by pointing to some of the most recent research on 
this topic.  
 
Introduction 
In his famous essay On the Solution of the Social Problem in 1848, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon argued that 
“The Republic is a positive anarchy […] it is the liberty that is the MOTHER, not the daughter, 
of order”1 What he meant by this was that the communities that anarchists build are the positive 
institutional embodiment of the negative principle of anarchy. Anarchy denotes a condition of 
liberty, of freedom from the arbitrary domination of government. But the positive incarnation of 
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this is a set of rules and principles, rights and duties that members of a community agree amongst 
themselves in order to constitute an order that will be the best means for them to realise their 
vision of the good. In this sense, institutions are central to freedom.  
 
No doubt this way of prefacing a survey of anarchist approaches to freedom will raise eyebrows. 
Aren’t anarchists antithetical to rules and institutions? The simple answer is no. In fact, Proudhon’s 
view of anarchy and the republic has, with considerable variation, constituted the largest part of 
the anarchist tradition ever since. It was a system which drew from the functional federation of 
the watchmakers of the Jura, and the complex institutional design of the Swiss confederation, both 
influencing the thinking of Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin, which fed through to the 
innumerable experiments in anarchist syndicalism, including the CNT and the IWW, transnational 
worker federations like the International Workingmen’s Association, the confederalist visions of 
political community in Bookchin’s municipalism, now taken and modified up by Abdula Ocalan 
and the Rojavan cantons of Kurdisan, and in Colin Ward’s post-statist visions for the European 
Union.2 
 
While the institutional imagination is central to the problem of freedom for anarchists, it is also 
premised on a sophisticated political philosophy, and it is this which this essay will primarily focus 
on, as a way of defending or substantiating this retelling of the story of anarchist approaches to 
freedom. I will first look to provide answers to questions such as what does it mean to be subject 
to arbitrary domination? How can one freely make oneself in community? In what ways are power 
and freedom related? What do we need to be free? Do anarchists think differently about the 
freedoms of groups to those of individuals? Have anarchists all and always thought about the need 
for institutions? In short, what do anarchists think freedom is?3 The aim is to show that answers 




My argument is that for the majority of anarchists you can only be free in conjunction with others, 
and most anarchists have developed quite elaborate institutional designs to defend this anarchic 
community. Taking society seriously means we also need to take seriously the problem of the ways 
in which societies should relate to one another, such that we can be collectively free in the presence 
of those who also want to be collectively free from you. Are the same theories applicable to free 
groups that are applicable to free individuals? This is a subject that is routinely overlooked when 
we discuss freedom, and not only by anarchists. Usually group freedoms are denied because only 
individuals, it is argued, can be bearers of moral right, and it is only through individuals that right 
can be enacted or realised.4 But this argument doesn’t seem to hold, ironically enough, when it 
comes to the rights of states. States are sovereign, it is argued, and their freedom is inviolable 
(except when other states chose for it not to be). Moreover, it is routinely argued, it is from this 
sovereign collective that the individual gets their freedom, and, ironically, while individuals cannot 
be trusted to live alone without states, and their immediate communities are denied political 
autonomy and representation (unions, families, tribes, cities, etc.,), states can and must be trusted 
to co-exist without descending into mass violence.5  
 
In this chapter I will show that anarchists develop a robust theory of freedom that links individuals 
with groups, groups with each other, and articulates conceptions of freedom with what ought to 
be present and what ought to be absent in order for us to be free. I will show that the anarchist 
theory of freedom has roots in three traditions of political thought, republican socialism, liberal 
utilitarianism and left-Hegelian, and that these origins shape the broad contours of how 
contemporary anarchists approach the question of individual and collective freedom in modern 
society. While the context is important, I also divide these three approaches analytically, to show 
what they imply in terms of three types of freedoms: negative freedoms from external domination; 
positive freedoms, meaning rights to certain conditions and visions of the good; and freedoms in, 
or substantive claims about the sorts of institutions anarchists ought to build. I close the discussion 
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with a set of claims about what anarchists ought not to defend. I argue that while autonomy, 
empowerment and independence are valuable, they ought not to be seen as absolute values to be 
defended without due regard for the competing demand for institutionalisation and 
constitutionalisation. This claim will strike many as implausibly anarchist, but I will show that in 
fact it is consistent with much of what anarchists have always done, even if they haven’t always 
articulated it in these terms. The fullest freedom possible, for the most people and in defence of 
the primary values, I will argue, hinges on robust anarchist institutions.6    
 
The philosophical context of anarchist accounts of freedom  
 
One thing that has been remarkably consistent in the history of anarchist thinking about freedom, 
has been to contrast ideas about what it means to be free with it’s a specific antonym: domination. 
Uri Gordon puts it like this: “[t]he term domination in its anarchist sense serves as a generic 
concept for the various systematic features of society whereby groups and persons are controlled, 
coerced, exploited, humiliated, discriminated against, etc. – the dynamics of which anarchists seek 
to uncover, challenge and erode.”7 He continues that “any act of resistance, is in the barest sense, 
‘anarchist’ when it is perceived by the actor as a particular actualisation of a more systemic 
opposition to domination.”8 Not only is domination shorthand for multiple intersecting regimes 
that render us less free or unfree, but to combat these directly is what makes anarchists anarchists.  
Domination has historically been a key object of attack for anarchists, and it was often treated as 
synonymous with authority, hierarchy, slavery, law, and so on. This conceptual proliferation was 
generally caused by the populist rhetoric of anarchists, but also the range of concepts used by those 
they engaged, and has no doubt resulted in much conceptual confusion. For example, authority 
means something quite different during the death throes of absolutist states than it does today, in 
societies with advanced and impersonal bureaucracies. Likewise hierarchy can mean rank ordering 
as well as a relation of domination, and the former is not always synonymous with the latter. Law 
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was often the expression of the will of monarchs and leaders, whereas today, there is at least 
democratic access to law making in principle, even if in practice it is very distant from our grasp. 
Cutting through this complexity is important if we are to understand what it is we want to be free 
from.  
 
One concept that united thinking about freedom, and still has incredible heuristic value for us 
today, is slavery. Slavery as an institution and as a condition epitomises what it means to be unfree. 
A slave is subject to the arbitrary domination of the slave master. The slavemaster forces the slave 
to act against her will, and even in the absence of direct interference, will remain a looming threat 
that will cause those subject to his or her command to toady and submit, limiting the fullest 
realisation of who that person could be by conceiving oneself as simply the property, and hence 
an extension of the will of the owner. This is not simply an individual-individual relationship, but 
an institution and structure of social relations from which many benefit(ed) indirectly, whether it 
kept the wages of non-slaves artificially high, the costs of goods artificially low, or the pleasures of 
life, whether legal equality, or the ability to have a public life, premised on the exploitation and 
inequality of slaves.9 Slavery was not abolished in the United States until 1861 and Russia in 1863, 
that is, at precisely the time anarchism became a mass movement Europe-wide. But what is also 
crucial is the language through which this account of freedom was articulated, and at this time, 
there were three primary sets of discourses that shaped anarchist thinking: liberal utilitarianism, 
republicanism and socialism.10   
 
The liberal tradition was vast and practically impossible to summarise in a few lines here, but in so 
far as liberals considered the problem of freedom and slavery, the response was in terms of self-
ownership, and the problem was to theorise and extrapolate the consequences of self-ownership 
for social order. If I am self-governing and your interference with me is a violation of this 
autonomy, how can society exist, and where would it come from? From Hobbes to Adam Smith 
6 
 
to Mandeville’s fable of the bees, the general proposition was that liberty consisted in harmonising 
self-interest, the free exchange of goods and services, and in order for political society to exist, the 
alienation of one’s property in the self to the state, and to the employer. Thus merchants and 
industrialists, as well as the state, could in principle rely on the voluntary relinquishing of your right 
to your self-ownership, that is by leasing your body to an employer, or giving up part of your 
autonomy in return for state protection. 
 
This vision of freedom repulsed Rousseau, arguably the modern political philosophers who had 
the most influence on the development of anarchism. Chapter one of his Social Contract opens with 
the following words: “Man is born free; but everywhere he is in chains.”11 The reason for this 
slavery is the iniquity of the systems of autocratic domination, in which the people are governed 
by force and not rules, slaves to their material interests rather than the good, and in giving their 
tacit consent to the autocratic institutions of the state, had in effect enslaved themselves once 
more. Money, luxury and self-interest were the bane of society, which led to a psychological 
enslavement to common mores, and the endorsement of a tacit political enslavement to the Old 
Order. Only a system of universal laws, agreed by direct, voluntary, or presumed consent, could 
counter this political enslavement.  
 
The second most famous formulation of the problem of slavery and freedom in the nineteenth 
century is Hegel’s master-slave dialectic.12 Here, while the master and slave face each other as 
unequals, their demand that the other recognise their status as (non)master or (non)slave, demands 
a mutual recognition, which is the motor of the development of self-consicousness, destroying the 
particularity, or assumed transcendent nature of that relationship, and waking both to the equality 
at the heart of social relations. Hegel believed that the ideal context for this mutual recognition is 
the legal state, in which citizens can attain collective sense of their social nature, something which 
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was primordial in the people, but overlaid by unjust institutions which distorted this nascent 
freedoms.  
 
William Godwin (1756-1836) is arguably one of Rousseau’s first anarchistic readers, but a reader 
steeped in the utilitarian traditions of eighteenth century liberal England. Whether he is an 
anarchist or not need not detain us here. What is more significant is the way in which so many 
have read him as such and have deployed his ideas to anarchistic ends over two hundred years 
after his death. His utilitarianism presumed that the greatest happiness for the greatest number 
could only be attained by each coming to the fulfilment of their own rational and moral self-
direction, and that all means to that end of general happiness were permissible, come what may. 
This is not, however, a strictly consequentialist logic, because Godwin objected to liberalism and 
Rousseau’s social contract on the grounds that the alienation of individual liberty to the lawmaker 
(for example) was antithetical to the absolute injunction to independence of will, and implied a 
justification of coercion, obedience and unjustified authority. Godwin’s rejection of bourgeois 
property relations were also advanced on utilitarian grounds. Private property precipitated poverty 
and inequality, which in turn made the poor dependent on the wills of the rich. For Godwin, 
freedom is only possible where individual judgement is unimpeded, and in relations unconstrained 
by force of habit, of will, or of condition.  
 
Slavery was the antithesis of freedom for Godwin, and his wife Mary Wolstencraft, and a typical 
example of this bourgeois slavery was the marriage contract.  This was a system of legal bondage 
that also rendered women unfree by habitual resignation to the norms of society that dictated she 
would be a second class citizen, dulling her sense of self, all the while consecrated by state and 
church and through the economic means of dowry and family contract, most obviously in the 




From Godwin, then, we can trace a conception of anarchic freedom that is utilitarian, rationalist 
and concerned primarily with a rejection of the interference of the state or of other bodies in the 
autonomously developed ideas of the individual. But we can trace another reading of Rousseau 
and slavery to the ideas of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), who deployed Rousseau’s ideas 
in order to reject catholic morality, republican democracy, and the emerging liberal capitalist 
relations of mid-nineteenth century France. Like Rousseau, Proudhon argued that inequality of 
conditions and of status rendered people unfree, and like Godwin, Proudhon disagreed that the 
republican state, democratic and/or legal, could provide for this freedom, precisely because 
through individual political representation the political and social capacity of all the constitutive 
collective forces that shaped society, from the town to the guild, from families to regions, was 
elided and actively supressed.13  
 
Proudhon connected the state to the emergence of capitalism, and both to slavery and domination 
in a way that had not been done before. Proudhon’s argument was that defending claims of 
property in the person as the basis of liberal freedoms, was a transformation of slavery into wage 
slavery, rather than its abolition. To be a self-owner was no less ludicrous than to be a rightful 
owner of anyone else, he thought, because Proudhon rejected the idea that there were natural laws 
to the self or anyone else. Rather, he argued, given the social construction of our individuality, as 
well as society itself, we are all of necessity beholden to one another and therefore have an equal 
right to stipulate the terms of our social relationships. Tolstoy took this argument to its logical 
conclusion in a way that Proudhon did not.14  He argued that all law and right, republican law too, 
in so far as it prohibited the free association of peoples and the free development of human 
capacity, was based on force, and so far as force was needed to compel people to order, that order 
was merely a transformation of slavery, not its abolition. Tolstoy, like Proudhon, agreed too that 
the state, because it required capital to persist, would press the interests of the propertied against 
those of the property less, which produced a clear class cleavage in society, between workers and 
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employers, and between employers and the state and everyone else. The republican state’s defence 
of Catholic morality, with its focus on providence, transcendental hierarchies and irrationalism, 
was central to possibility of this new slavery.  
 
In his later works, and unlike most of his anarchist comrades, Proudhon linked this twin process 
of state building and capitalism to colonialism and imperialism, relations which he also understood 
to be enslaving. The republican freedom of the French was predicated on the unfreedom of the 
non-French, whether in Algeria, Mexico, the Italian peninsula or elsewhere.15 This oppression of 
‘foreign’ peoples had its correlate in the oppression of the diverse cultures and nations of France, 
which Proudhon counted in the hundreds in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, before the 
Napoleonic centralisation and homogenisation of the country. We can see similar processes in all 
major statebuilding exercises.16 Freedom, for Proudhon, could not therefore be an individual or 
formal status, it had to be collective and formally so too. For him, freedom was only possible in 
shared political institutions, institutions that defended the autonomies of groups in relation to one 
another as much as the freedoms of individuals, and he called this federalism.17 Proudhon’s hands 
these republican institutions look completely unlike anything that his contemporaries would have 
recognised as a state, being more localist and transnational, but federalist in spirit and law (I discuss 
this in more detail below).  
 
While for Godwin, freedom is an individual mental state that requires certain social conditions to 
help it flourish, for Proudhon freedom is social, and in so far as groups are not free, nor are 
individuals. His conception of anarchic freedom is also civic, rights based, and institutionalised, in 
a way that for Tolstoy, and most anarchists that followed him, it was not – at least not explicitly. 
This latter tendency tends to trace its evolution to Hegel. But this Hegelian legacy in anarchist 
thought divides spectacularly between the works of Michael Bakunin (1814-1876) and Max Stirner 
(1806-1856), both of whom were active participants in the Young Hegelian movement in the late 
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1830s. Both Stirner and Bakunin were drawn to the idea that political subjectivity was inherited 
and socially constructed, and both saw this to be almost wholly nefarious. But where Bakunin was 
profoundly influenced by revolutionary republicanism and the writings of Karl Marx, Stirner was 
not.  
 
From Hegel, both Stirner and Bakunin agreed that human consciousness was historically and 
socially located, and that our conceptions of freedom were inherited from religion, primarily. The 
objective of being free was to take control of this process of self-consciousness forming. The 
question was, where ought this to take place and how. For Stirner, any attempt to create new 
doctrines of freedom, or to make the construction of individuality a social process, would 
automatically re-inscribe new dogmas. For Bakunin, the individual’s “freedom and reason, are the 
products of society, and not vice versa: society is not the product of individuals comprising it”.18 
The point is that society proceeds us and we are its products, and only at the margins is our 
individual influence felt. Thus, the only way to come to true ideas about freedom was to first 
liberate society from the historical forces that constrained it and in so doing, consciousness itself 
would emerge. The way in which this would take place was through a dialectical process of 
destruction and renewal, where the experience of injustice, or of domination, awakens in the 
subject a desire for recognition, which is always contextually bound, generates a rebellion and a 
then reconstruction. For example, drawing on his reading of Marx’s Das Capital, Bakunin argued 
that the emergence of capitalism had awakened the workers to their new status as wage slaves, 
forced to sell themselves in order to live.19 The class conflict that ensued was the motor of history. 
Where he departed from his German contemporary was on the status of the state in this process 
of emancipation, and on the virtues of freedom as such.20  
 
For Bakunin and Stirner, freedom and unfreedom, while socially generated, were not reducible to 
those social conditions, but rather emerged dialectically within them.  Where Stirner breaks from 
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Marx and Bakunin is in finding freedom in a pre- or a-social, though no less ontologically 
grounded, domain. Stirner argued that the idea of freedom was itself shaped by social ideas, and 
didn’t reflect anything transcendent or necessary. Republicanism was therefore an ideology of 
freedom, not the fulfilment of it, and in so far as ideologies tend to result in their uncritical 
acceptance by their followers, rendered them unfree at the same time. This is some contradiction, 
when ideas meant to emancipate us enslave us. Stirner, looked at the pre ideological state and 
asked, what do those who would emancipate themselves draw from? The fact that slaves are able 
to choose to be free and have a sense of their unfreedom independent of these ideologies, and are 
compelled to freedom in spite of this relative ignorance, implies an ontological freedom that is 
pre-social that they are seeking to recover. It is in recognising this ontological freedom (and implied 
equality) that our “ownness”, poorly translated as egoism, is to be found.21 Where this takes us in 
terms of social order it is not clear, and I explore this below, because there is nothing in this 
account that permits of a vision of the good, but rather pulls us against the social. There are also 
clear links here with Godwin’s ideas, specifically the notion that freedom is a cognitive or epistemic 
status, precisely because it is the understanding of a condition that leads to the status, not the social 
conditions of its collective realisation. I explore this further in the final section of the chapter. But 
before we throw this out for lacking appropriate socialist credentials, it is important to see that 
Stirner shows us that freedom is not a domain towards which we can flee, nor is there such a place 
against which our contemporary liberty can be benchmarked. Rather, what matters is the 
individual, and social, conditions of (collective) emancipation.  
 
What can we take from this first set of observations? First of all, the systems of domination we 
face are historical and social, and freeing ourselves from them is the primary demand of an anarchist 
ethics. This demands a critical philosophy able to uncover these systems of domination, and (as 
Stirner tells us) to be able to see within these social philosophies the legacies of domination too, 
whether of inherited ideas, or the ways in which theory sustains other modes of domination. 
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Secondly, classical anarchists wrote extensively on the necessary conditions for freedom, but they 
disagreed on what these would be. Finally, what were the appropriate institutional frameworks in 
which we might realise freedom, if any were appropriate at all? Distinguishing freedom from, from 
freedom to and freedom in, is a very useful way of theorising freedom from an anarchist point of 




One way to explore the legacy of these ideas, and to unpack their logic a little more, is to do so via 
a useful, but somewhat distracting distinction between positive and negative liberty, devised by 
Isiah Berlin in 1958 as an analytical tool to distinguish liberals from socialists during the Cold 
War.22 Negative accounts of freedom stipulate what you ought to be free from without stating 
what this would necessarily entail, while positive accounts of freedom denote the social or political 
conditions necessary for the flourishing of individuality, the latter being synonymous with 
freedom. For Berlin, the benefit of the former over the latter is negative freedoms do not stipulate 
what is needed in order for one to be free, only what ought to be absent. The problem with positive 
accounts of freedom is that the struggle to put into place the conditions necessary for freedom 
might well undermine negative freedoms, and tends to a consequentialist logic. For example, the 
Soviet drive for equality, and the denial of private property in the self and non-interference as a 
basis for freedom, led to the gulags.  
 
This framing makes it very difficult to theorise anarchism as a political philosophy of freedom 
classically understood. Anarchists are stern advocates for social and material equality as 
preconditions to human flourishing, and argue that very particular forms of social organisation are 
central to the possibility of freedom, from municipal organisations in the work of Murray 
Bookchin, to revolutionary syndicalist unions in the work of Rudolf Rocker, to affinity groups, 
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intentional communities, communes, and so on and so forth. But anarchists also declaim the state 
and all manner of other forms of arbitrary domination and suggest that freedom can only be 
realised in their absence. Can the two concepts of freedom be reconciled? Let’s first unpack what 
anarchists mean by negative liberty, then we will look at positive accounts of freedom in anarchist 
thought, before looking at the question of institutions in more detail in the penultimate section of 
this chapter.  
 
The first thing to note is that for a theory of negative freedom to be valuable at all, it must be 
unhooked from any necessary predicates. You can’t be strictly free in the negative sense if your 
freedom depends on the apriori presence of some other thing. In other words, to be free in the 
negative sense of the term can mean any number of different things, but all of which must denote 
a freedom from some external constraint, which cannot then presuppose that the state, for 
example, is a transcendent good. One cannot be both free from patriarchy, and have men run the 
show. For anarchists in the nineteenth century this meant that there was no negative freedom 
worth defending that also had the state, positive constitutional law or capitalism as its necessary 
social and institutional context. If these things could be shown to be constraints on my negative 
freedom, such that I am unable to be free in the negative sense in their presence, then they must 
be dismantled or radically reformed in order that I can be free.  
 
Let’s look at patriarchy as a good example here. Proudhon’s conception of freedom from 
domination presumed that in order for men to be free, men must have the fullest scope for 
participation in the public institutions that shape our social life. The state could not provide that 
in the nineteenth century and arguably fails to do this to this day. But part and parcel of Proudhon’s 
argument was the claim that in order for men to have this public role, women need to run the 
home and refrain from taking public roles. While Proudhon rejected the bourgeois marriage 
contract as enslaving, he nevertheless believed (incorrectly) that women were naturally physically 
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and mentally inferior to men. He also believed the quack science of his day that women played no 
role in procreation except as receptacles of the ‘seed’. Given this passive nature and having no 
public role, the home was women’s rightful domain, where they could focus on raising children 
and countering masculine virtue.23  
 
Anarcha-feminism first emerged out of a critical engagement with Proudhon’s ideas, pushing them 
further in a negative sense that he did. Henriette Wild, responding to Proudhon’s writings on love 
and marriage wrote the following: “Sainte Proudhon […] the right of the strongest, constitutes the 
most sinful of properties [… and] in love, property is [thus] rape.”24 Proudhon believed that a 
social contract between men and women would equalise their natural inequality, bringing women 
into society with men in ways they otherwise could not due to this inferiority. Proudhon’s theories 
on gender and sexuality were empirically and conceptually ludicrous One of his most vocal and 
forthright critics, Jenny De Herricourt put it like this:  “You have naively mistaken the scalpel of 
your imagination for that of science.”25   
 
Twenty years later and across the Atlantic, Voltarine de Cleyre made similar arguments, arguing 
that women ought to reject the logic of property and selfhood:  ‘Young girls! If any one of you is 
contemplating marriage remember that is what the contract means. The sale of the control of your 
person in return for “protection and support.”’26 De Cleyre called for ‘equal freedom’, where 
freedoms are not relative to this or that social status or role, but of a fundamental ontological 
nature, where men and women are recognised as being equal, and that this equality consists in their 
freedom to be who they desire to be and engage freely with others as equals, free of social, 
intellectual and material constraints.  
 
An early twentieth century brand of Stirnerite feminist egoism took this argument one step further. 
Rather than present an immanent critique of patriarchal anarchist theory, Dora Marsden, for 
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example, rejected the anarchist tendency to kow tow to doctrines, emancipatory or not (Kinna 
2011). This tendency to defer to established critical theory was typical of the women’s movement 
more generally, she thought, imposing doctrines of liberty, rather than encouraging independent 
free thought. Appeals to the virtues of femininity, as opposed to masculinity, or to universal human 
qualities, imposed conceptions of what it meant to be these things upon others. Spontaneity and 
individuality, the hallmarks of anarchism, were only possible in the absence of doctrine. 
 
If we take this line of thinking to one extreme, it is not difficult to pigeon hole anarchists as extreme 
liberals, or ‘hyper-liberals’,27 vigorously defending a sphere of non-interference, clamouring for a 
pristine refuge from the social and epistemic clenches of society, somewhere where they can live 
a life unencumbered by the pressures of other people. This no doubt resonates with some of the 
more primitivst conceptions of anarchism,28 and would also likely find support in the ideas of some 
of the reclusive communalists scattered across modern societies. Here, rejecting the imposition of 
rules, of hierarchies of domination and rank ordering, and of oppressive social norms, is the 
corollary to a conception of freedom as a state of unencumbered isolation. But to conflate 
anarchism with this tendency would be a mistake. Indeed, as I will show, this freedom from can 
be institutionalised in impressive ways, ways that are consistent with anarchist ideals. 
Unfortunately, strict negative libertarians have tended to let in an authoritarian night-watchman 
state in by the back door, and in some cases the front.29 In order to get a fuller sense of what an 
anarchist institution ought to look like, we must first get a sense of what it is they ought to promote, 




For women in the nineteenth century, the right to work was central to freedom from material 
dependence on men. For anarchists, and revolutionary socialists of other varieties too, the struggle 
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this involved meant devising ways of emancipating labour too, since to work for a master, under 
the strictures of modern capitalism meant nothing but wage slavery, whether you were a woman 
or a man.30 The question then was less what should we get rid of in order to be free, but what do 
we need in place such that we can be free?  
 
Positive theories of freedom can be understood as justifications of particular scope conditions, or 
necessary conditions and attributes, needed in order to be able to be free. They might also be 
virtues in the presence of which, or through the practice of which, we can be said to be human, 
the fulfilment of which is the purpose of the good life, or eudemonia. For example, I may have all 
the rights in the world, and be free from all immediate acts of interference, but without the means 
to exercise these freedoms am I really free? Also, without a positive conception of what it means 
to be a human being, what exactly do my negative freedoms afford me? A pure negative liberty 
would leave me directionless and treading water. Without the resources to develop, in what 
meaningful sense am I free? Put another way, we might argue that without a vision of the good, 
that is, what it means to be a virtuous and three dimensional political subject, we cannot really 
know what it is we need to free ourselves from, what it is that impedes us, what it is that we ought 
to struggle for.  
 
Two of the most outstanding statements of the positive conceptions of anarchist freedom are 
undoubtedly those of John Clark and Murray Bookchin, comrades and brothers in arms in many 
respects, though they differ vociferously on the detail of their social ecology. What unites both 
thinkers is their defence of Hegel and how he can be used to anarchist ends to theorise positive 
conceptions of freedom. Hegel is used by these two social ecologists in two ways: as a method and 
in order to conceptualise the positive society. Both Bookchin and Clark lament the failure of 
anarchists to take Hegel’s dialectics seriously, for in it, they argue is an important set of 
observations about how direct action, that is individual and collective attempts at relatively 
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unmediated attempts at the transformation of society, is constitutive of that future society. This 
may seem self-evident, after all, how else is society changed, but given the legacy of Hegel in social 
theory, it is an important move to make, placing agency in the hands of individuals and 
communities, without ignoring the social determinates of social action. Furthermore, for both 
Clark and Bookchin, the dialectic of recognition is an ecological one, in which humans come to 
understand themselves in dialectical relation with nature.31 Finally, given that the process of self-
understanding and social development is open, there is no necessary telos to this process, for Clark 
at least.  
 
In The Ecology of Freedom and Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Murray Bookchin’s takes this notion of 
complexity and chaos, and aligns it with a Hegelian notion of social emergence, to ground a 
positive conception of political community and freedom.32 For him, no society that permits of 
formal, or informal but socially enforced or sanctioned, rank hierarchies of domination meets the 
demands of mutual recognition, or of equality. Gender parity, the end of anthropocentrism (or 
post-humanism in another key), and so on are all the prerequisites of his social ecology. An 
ecological society must also be built from within the society in which we find ourselves. It will 
need to be highly complex, Bookchin argues, such that the diversity and the openness that this 
implies, creates endless possibilities for becoming and social transformation. While this meant 
anarcho-syndicalism at one time, Bookchin prefers the revitalisation of municipal politics as the 
locus of politics, and the federation of municipal centres transnationally.33  
 
There is no doubt here that the struggle for recognition is prefigurative, in the sense that the ends 
and means are congruent, and are socially or contextually bound. For Ben Franks, this account of 
prefiguration aligns neatly with virtue ethics as understood via the writings of Alastair MacIntyre.34 
MacIntyre denies that there is any transhistorical conception of reason that can undergird a theory 
of the good, or any transhistorical notion of freedom that can shape our actions today.35 Rather 
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virtues, such as courage, justice, or solidarity, are historically and culturally specific, sustained 
through practices and defended through the establishment of institutions. Institutions in anarchist 
terms can vary from affinity groups to revolutionary syndicalist unions, from the general 
assemblies of the Occupy Wall Street camps to the Paris Commune. I will discuss these in a little 
more detail in the following section, but suffice to say that none of these are the best or final way 
of realising the good for anarchists. They perform functions, can be instrumentalised, but also are 
explicitly animated by the virtues, or values, that anarchist hold dear, and in this sense are always 
historically and spatially contingent expressions of the good and of freedom from an anarchist 
point of view. But most importantly, they are nurseries in which society itself is raised. Proudhon 
called these expressions of collective reason and collective force and, like Bookchin later, argued 
that these ought to be federated and constitutionally defended.36 I now develop these ideas in a 
little more detail.  
 
Freedom in or freedom with? Anarchism and the question of institutions  
 
If we take the view that freedom is something we have to experience with people in groups, but 
also a freedom from constraints or dominations, this doesn’t tell us much about how these groups 
ought to be formed, nor does it imply that the groups so formed will automatically be freedom-
enhancing. Indeed, one of the most significant critiques of the lack of institutionalisation of affinity 
groups in the women’s movement also bears directly on the anarchist movement. Jo Freeman’s 
influential article ‘The Tyranny of Structurelessness’37 argued that in groups without formal 
institutional frameworks and clear decision making procedures, informal elites will and do emerge. 
These are often simple friendship groups to begin with, but result in ossified and informal social 
structures of power that make it very difficult to locate accountability and to democratise 
participation (where democratising means facilitating the whole demos to speak). Groups that lack 




A similar argument is made of the international order, that is, the relations between peoples are 
informal and therefore structured by relations of domination and hierarchy. For numerous authors, 
anarchy is the solution, a formal anarchy in which the autonomy of states is defacto guaranteed, 
an ‘anarchic freedom’ of sorts.38 But for most this would merely cement the power of the most 
powerful. The alternative is to constitutionalise, but again, the constitutional process in world 
politics tends to favour the most powerful.39 While the formal structure of their relations is 
anarchic, it is nonetheless governed by power and the institution of sovereignty and non-
interference, and very clear hierarchies have emerged between states, with elites consolidating class 
power between them. 
 
So, should anarchists institutionalise or not? For anarchists like Uri Gordon, the answer is no.40 
Anarchist societies are anarchist in so far as they are fluid and the possibility of change is always 
open. Institutionalisation closes this down. Gordon defines institutionalisation as the adoption of 
binding and formal rules, which in so far as they are binding make them un-anarchist and if they 
are not binding then they are not institutionalised. This is a real puzzle and one worth exploring 
to elaborate the third dimension of freedom in anarchist thought.  
 
What is an institution? Institutions are not too dissimilar to regimes, a term Gordon uses (above) 
to denote nefarious informality. In International Relations (IR) scholarship, perhaps an odd place 
to turn, there has been extensive discussion of institutions that anarchists might draw on here. 
Formally at least, the international domain lacks a final point of authority. What scholars disagree 
about is what maintains order in this stateless domain. Is it capitalism, the biopolitics of 
neoliberalism, the balance of power between states, patriarchy, or institutions like NATO, OPEC 
of the UN? In many respects capitalism and patriarchy are both institutions, but we distinguish 
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them in order to distinguish between purposeful intentional institutions, and emergent structures 
of power.  
 
When we think about it carefully, there is not a collection of anarchists anywhere that is not 
governed in some way by something like formal or informal rules or emergent structures of power, 
whether this is a set of decision making procedures, or an informal set of rules, norms or habits 
reproduces their communities. What marks the anarchists out is the ways in which these rules, 
norms and decision making procedures are benchmarked against positive and negative accounts 
of freedom, and the degree to which participation and active involvement are key. To this end, 
anarchists have proven to be real innovators when it comes to institutions. From unions, to 
intentional communities, communes, worker owned factories and so on and so forth, consist in a 
set of formal and often informal rules, subgroups nested or affiliated within or alongside one 
another, and elaborate and varied decision making procedures aimed at maximising participation 
and inclusivity.  
 
Freedoms are constituted by the mutual constraints placed upon free agency by our agreed decision 
making procedures, while the rules developed collectively and collaboratively shape mutual 
interactions, and the nature of that decision making. Where these rules are written down they give 
longevity to those groups, enabling them to outlive 100% of their participants and persist in a 
recognisable form into the future. The most successful such institutions in the anarchist movement 
have been the anarcho-syndicalist unions. The CNT  in Spain had 700,000 members at the height 
of its influence, while today it has a fraction of that. More work needs to be done to see whether 
the constitutions of these groups exclude or include, whether they are historical millstones or 
important rallying points. But one thing is clear, they are enduring. As Lucien Van Der Walt and 
Steven Hirsch have pointed out, syndicalist and revolutionary syndicalist unions were stronger and 
more numerous outside Europe and North America, and a global context for understanding these 
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institutions is central to understanding the global historical institutionalisation of anarchist 
movements, not to mention their roles in shaping 20th century world history.41  
 
What is as interesting for our purposes is the way in which most anarchist labour organisations 
have historically been federations, and the ways in which this federative model pervades anarchist 
organising. Federalism was central to the normative and institutional vision of Bakunin, Kropotkin 
and Proudhon, as I have discussed above. For all three, what was to be federated was much more 
than geographical locales and the centres of power therein. Rather, all had in mind the multiple 
and plural groups and economic units that workers and citizens would reclaim. Each economic 
unit would meet the needs of the locale, or functional body (like unions, postal services, etc.,), each 
locale would act as a regional administrative unit, each regional or functional administrative unit 
would be federated with others to coordinate across wider scales, but would not supersede the 
others in an institutional hierarchy. Rather the economic and administrative units would nest 
within one another, with members from each taking part in the administration of the other, and 
vice versa, cooperatively.42 Proudhon believed that the formalisation of these relations was 
inevitable, and that the authority structures that would emerge would need to be counterbalanced 
with the liberties that people demanded.43 And this was a vision of order and freedom that was 
remarkably consistent throughout his life. As he put it in What is Property?:  
 
Liberty is equality, because liberty exists only in society; and in the absence of 
equality there is no society. Liberty is anarchy, because it does not admit the 
government of the will, but only the authority of the law; that is, of necessity. 
Liberty is infinite variety, because it respects all wills within the limits of the law.44  
 
Freedom and institutionalisation are co-dependent. Community-building is necessarily an 
institutionalising project, embedding social practices such that they become relatively durable, give 
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all a sense of the rules of the game, and a hand in shaping them. But as institutions become durable, 
they also become outward facing, concerned with their own longevity, and they grow and change 
internally and in their relations with other groups. This complex and non-linear process will throw 
up challenges and problems, and invariably lead to the sacrifice of the virtues and the development 
of vice. Whether states or communes, institutions need critical care and attention, reflection and 
analysis. Developing this critical understanding is partly what creates them, gives them direction 
and is an indication of, and enables, mass participation.  
 
Against empowerment, autonomy and independence  
 
Thus far I have argued that freedom is always relative to a social material and intellectual context, 
and to be durable will need to be institutionalised. In short, there is no non-social domain of 
freedom. If this is the case, there are three concepts that anarchist regularly use to understand 
freedom that probably ought to be rejected as foundational principles for anarchist ethics and 
theorising freedom. These are empowerment, autonomy and independence. It is not that 
anarchists ought not to be empowered, autonomous or independent, only that that these cannot 
be consistent groundings for an anarchist social theory of freedom in the absence of 
institutionalisation. 
 
Take away all social impediments and consider the subject as an ontological singularity. Assume 
that all social imaginaries, like law and the state, place the possibility of freedom outside ourselves 
in institutions, and so must be rejected. Who we are, or who we would become, is left to the 
happenchance of our ability to achieve a status within these epistemic domains. Unless I can 
determine the conditions of my own identity, I am not free. For Max Stirner, freedom is a chimera 
in this context. For Stirner, realising our freedom consists in mastering all these external forces 
such that each is a voluntarily chosen part of ourselves – we internalise the social, in other words, 
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we remove all social impediments to our personally defined subjectivity. For Stirner, being free is 
not the same as realising it in any given context. Realising ones freedom is about self-mastery and 
the appropriation of social and epistemic properties you require to make you who you are. Saul 
Newman sums it up like this: ‘Freedom, for Stirner, should be a question of self-empowerment 
and the recognition and affirmation of one’s own self as the condition and measure of freedom, 
rather than any external condition.’45  
 
But how can I be free in the absence of other people, and if there are other people, how do we 
regulate our coaction and our mutual attempts to be ourselves, without recognising needs and 
demands, or visions of the good, beyond ourselves? This isn’t all. Let’s look more deeply at this 
question of empowerment. For Uri Gordon freedom is centrally a question of empowerment. It 
is through empowerment that we are able to resist domination. Following Starhawk, Gordon 
argues empowerment is first a critique and battle against “power-over”, that is the rule of others 
over us. In order to actualise or realise the promise of this critique, we have to develop “power to” 
and power with”. These three faces of power map neatly onto our conception of freedom outlined 
above. “Power to” relates to mastery and learning, “power with” to the cooperativeness and 
support necessary to personal empowerment in mutualist communities. Central to realising this is 
the redistribution of power to the end of “equality”,46 a system in which we are all equally unable 
to dominate, rather than one in which a distribution of goods reaches universal parity.47 This can 
be a fluid and negotiated rebalancing of power relations in accordance with principles of solidarity 
and equality, but it is one which is primarily predicated on communities of identity, not institutions 
of collective self-rule.48  
 
Gordon rejects the institutionalist argument for anarchist politics on the grounds that 
formalisation does not counter the imbalances of power, but would sediment new ones, and it 
would remove the personalisation of the anarchist political culture that has been so central to its 
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effectiveness and the possibility of realising equity and ‘power with’. Gordon prefers the anarchist 
impulse to ‘decentralisation’, the multiplication of centres, and ‘diffuse social sanctions’. A truly 
anarchist politics, Gordon argues, refuses institutionalisation, both in principle and in practice.49   
At some point, however, this struggle for autonomy, empowerment and independence, will result 
in the end of society itself. The Stirnerite injunction to question all social norms and to adopt only 
those that accord with one’s self-creation, would render a shared society impossible, unless of 
course a shared conception of the self is desirable, in which case owness itself becomes a less stable 
ontological category, and more an epistemic one. Gordon’s understanding of ‘power with’ will in 
some senses mollify the brute struggle for power empowerment entails, while the development of 
epistemic communities of power/knowledge that a more Foucauldian sensibility might suggest 
would develop ‘power with’ in more epistemic terms. But neither is particularly durable. When 
people become burnt out, tired or disillusioned, or they begin to dissociate with the group, the 
society will falter and fail. Likewise, it seems an implausible way to structure inter-group relations 
to rely on ideological cohesion or identity.  
 
Identity and epistemic community are necessary but not sufficient components of freedom. In 
order to develop the durability of communities, and to enable the linking of communities across 
time and space, institutionalisation is required, and for this to flourish, notions of right and pacts 
or contracts are probably necessary. We need to think creatively about the relationship between 
articulating the voice of the anarchist demos, as well as the limits of modern democracy, and how 
this would sit in productive tension with a set of rules and institutions that can provide the formal 
structure for those process, without undermining anarchist values. There is no simple answer to 
this problem, but anarchist political thought provides an incredibly sophisticated set of critical 






There are probably many more questions raised by this analysis than answers, for example, does 
non-domination stretch across generations? Can the long-dead arbitrarily dominate the living? 
Does our shared biology not suggest that there may be universal moral truths rooted therein? Does 
a principle of non-domination pertain to human relations to non-humans? There are extensive 
debates about each of these issues in the anarchist literature, but their detail did not constrain us 
here because my aim was somewhat more meta – to provide a background set of contexts and 
assumptions through which you might approach these questions yourself.  
 
That said, I have focused on one prominent tradition in the history of anarchism more than I have 
on others, by way of illustration. That is the republican tradition of anarchist praxis. This wing of 
the anarchist tradition engaged with freedom from the perspective of the social construction of 
the subject, and with a conception of the social conditions of freedom. This majority tradition was 
also highly institutionalised, whether in the syndicalist unions, in intentional communities, coops, 
federations, community organisations, municipal administration, military organisations like 
Durrutti’s column, Mahkno’s units, or elsewhere. These institutions were constituted along lines 
that defended maximal participation in the decisions that were likely to affect those who took part. 
In so doing they shaped an anarchist ethos through institutional design, producing anarchist 
subjects in the process. In their failings, as well as in their successes, they also acted as nurseries of 
the development of future anarchist thinking and practice, often highly critical of the structures of 
domination that had emerged in those institutions or within society at large. From the French 
mutual aid societies and the Paris Commune, through to Occupy Wall Street, Decolonize Oakland, 
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